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Claxton: WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT

Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution holds that
no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of the law.”1 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court cited
Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Whitney v. California, which held that “the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”2 The Due Process
Clause is not restricted to nor found in other guarantees enumerated in the
Constitution; rather, it is a “rational continuum” which protects against
arbitrary and unnecessary restraints or burdens placed upon the individual
by the government.3 There has always existed a large degree of
disagreement on the issue of abortion, and of the deeply personal issues or
consequences connected to the decision to terminate a pregnancy; these
debates have little bearing on the role of the Court—a role which is to
“define the liberty of all.”4 Thus, the constitutional protection of a woman’s
choice to terminate her pregnancy originates from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
In the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a plurality of the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade
of the constitutional right to have an abortion; however, the Casey Court
adopted the “undue burden” standard, ultimately changing the standard for
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.6 The Court held that if the
primary purpose of a state’s legislative or regulatory scheme “is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the
fetus attains viability,”7 an undue burden on a woman’s right to decide to
have an abortion exists and the provision of a law is constitutionally
invalid.8 While the state has a legitimate interest in promoting life or some
other rational goal, a statute is nevertheless unconstitutional if the effect of
the impugned statute or regulation creates an obstacle to a woman’s free
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (citing Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 373 (1927)).
3. Id. at 848 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).
4. Id. at 850.
5. Id. at 846 (See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973)).
6. Id. at 879.
7. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 878).
8. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
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choice.9 The Court in Casey held that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the [constitutional] right.”10
Twenty years later, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether two provisions of
Texas House Bill 2 (hereinafter “H.B. 2”) violated a woman’s right to
abortion.11 The Court applied the undue burden test utilized in Casey to
H.B. 2 and determined that the two provisions in question were in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the first provision
held to be unconstitutional was the so-called admitting-privileges
requirement, and the second provision held to be unconstitutional was in
respect of necessary clinic upgrades to meet surgical-center requirements.12
Thus, Whole Woman’s Health is a monumental case, as the Court
enumerated specific state action that constitutes an undue burden on
abortion access to women.13 Although the Court in Roe identified that “[a]
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient,”14 the
Court in Whole Woman’s Health explored the proper balance between a
woman’s safety and a woman’s choice.15
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2013, Texas enacted H.B. 2, which placed restrictions on
abortion clinics operating within the state.16 The first provision amended a
Texas law that had “previously required an abortion facility to maintain a
written protocol for ‘managing medical emergencies and the transfer of
patients requiring further emergency care to a hospital.’”17 The provision
stated, “[a] physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the
date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges
at a hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the location at
which the abortion is performed or induced” (hereinafter “admittingprivileges requirement”).18 The second provision stated, “the minimum
standards for an abortion facility must be equivalent to the minimum
9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
10. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
11. See id. at 2300.
12. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
13. See id. at 2309 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 150).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
15. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2016, 9:23
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposium-hanging-in-the-balance/.
16. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
17. Id. at 2300 (citing 38 TEX. REG. 6546 (2013)).
18. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West through the end of the 2015
Regular Session of the 84th Legislature).
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standards adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code section] for
ambulatory surgical centers” (hereinafter “surgical-center requirement”).19
Before the law took effect, a group of Texas abortion providers sought
facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges provision, and in October
2013, the District Court granted an injunction, but three days later the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction
and the provision took effect.20 A petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court was not filed.21
One week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, a group of abortion
providers, some of whom were plaintiffs in the previous case, filed suit in
Federal District Court.22 The plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing the
enforcement of the admitting-privileges provision, and the surgical-center
provisions across Texas, claiming that the provisions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Casey.23 The District Court held
the two provisions created an undue burden and restricted access to women
seeking “previability” abortions, and found such provisions would force
many abortion clinics in the State of Texas to close.24 In June 2015, Texas
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
the admitting-privilege and surgical-center provisions of H.B. 2, with minor
exceptions, to be constitutional, therefore reversing the District Court’s
holding, and allowing the provisions to take effect.25
In a 5-3 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that a pre-enforcement facial challenge of the admittingprivileges requirement did not have a res judicata effect,26 nor did the prior
suit preclude a challenge to the surgical-center requirement.27 The Court
held that the admitting-privileges requirement violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, as no evidence of health benefits for the women was
presented.28 Since the requirements would require the closure of nearly half
of the clinics operating in Texas, the record before the District Court
contained ample evidence to support the Court’s conclusion that the effects
19. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West through the end of the 2015 Regular
Session of the 84th Legislature).
20. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see generally Planned Parenthood of Greater
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013).
21. Id. at 2301.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680-81 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
25. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d
598 (5th Cir. 2015)).
26. Id. at 2304.
27. Id. at 2308.
28. Id. at 2313 (citing Casey, 505 U.S.at 895 (an undue burden is found when a substantial
obstacle impedes on a large number of a woman’s choice)).
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of H.B. 2 were an undue burden.29 Lastly, the Court found the surgicalcenter requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment because evidence
established that it was unnecessary and would reduce the number of legally
functioning clinics in Texas to about seven.30
III.

COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Breyer

On June 27, 2016, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Kagan joined.31 Justice Ginsburg, who concurred only in the judgment,
wrote separately to emphasize her view that targeted regulation of abortion
providers does little, if anything at all, to protect the health of women.32
In Part II of the opinion, before addressing the constitutional question,
the Supreme Court first considered the Court of Appeals’ two procedural
grounds for barring the petitioners’ constitutional challenges.33 Following
an extensive discussion, the Court reversed the lower court’s decision and
held that although some petitioners had previously brought a facial
challenge to the admitting-privileges requirement in Abbott and were
unsuccessful, “res judicata neither bars petitioners’ challenges to the
admitting privileges requirement nor prevents us from awarding facial
relief.”34
The Court held that the proven consequences of H.B. 2 had changed
substantially since Abbott was decided.35 The Court supported its argument
with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment f (1980),
which states, where “important human values—such as the lawfulness of
continuing personal disability or restraint—are at stake, even a slight change
of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a second
action may be brought.”36 Here, a large number of clinics had closed,
whereas no clinics had yet done so when Abbott was argued and decided,
and as such, a new claim existed that was not precluded.37 The Court also
reasoned that under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
29. Id.
30. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
31. Id. at 2299.
32. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel,
806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015)).
33. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2304.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2306.
36. Id. at 2305 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. f (1980)).
37. Id. at 2306-07 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
748 F.3d 583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014)).
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“final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”38 The Court
found nothing wrong with the District Court awarding more relief than the
parties requested or briefed.39
Furthermore, the Court held that petitioners did not have to bring their
surgical-center provision challenge in Abbott, as the lower court ruled, and
allowed the claim to be brought forth.40 The Court reasoned that the two
challenged provisions of H.B. 2 are individual and distinct, and that they
serve two functions.41 The approach that the Fifth Circuit used “would
require treating every statutory enactment as a single transaction which a
given party would only be able to challenge one time, in one lawsuit, in
order to avoid the effects of claim preclusion.”42 The Supreme Court ruled
that the Court of Appeals’ procedural rulings were incorrect for the reasons
noted.43
In Part III of the opinion, the Court analyzed the undue burden standard
as articulated in Roe and applied in Casey.44 The Court held that the Court
of Appeals’ interpretation of the first part of the standard was incorrect
where it implied that the existence or non-existence of medical benefits
should not be considered when deciding if a regulation of abortion
constitutes an undue burden.45 The Court instead held that burdens which
laws impose on abortion access should be considered together with the
benefits of those laws.46
Next, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals’ test was “wrong
to equate the judicial review applicable to the regulation of a
constitutionally protected personal liberty with less strict review applicable
where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”47 In contrast, the
Court found the Casey standard more appropriate when it “ask[ed] courts to
consider whether any burden imposed on abortion is ‘undue.’”48
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that legislatures must resolve questions
of medical uncertainty and not the courts.49 The Court reasoned that

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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Id.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
Id. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 150).
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considerable weight of evidence and judicial proceedings should be used
when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortions.50
In Part IV of the opinion, the Court supported the District Court’s
holding that H.B. 2’s admitting-privileges requirement imposed an undue
burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.51 The Court found that
although the purpose of the admitting-privileges requirement was to help
ensure women had quick and efficient access to hospitals should any
problems arise during the abortion procedure, there was no significant
health-related problems that the new law purported to remedy.52 When
questioned directly, Texas was unable to identify a single instance when the
new requirement would have provided women with better treatment during
the abortion process.53
Moreover, the Court found that a significant number of abortion clinics
were closing due to this requirement as “hospitals often condition admitting
privileges on reaching a certain number of admissions per year,” and that
due to the relative safety of the procedure, doctors who worked at clinics
and performed abortions were not admitting enough patients to nearby
hospitals to maintain their admitting privileges.54 Further—the clinic
closures resulted in: fewer doctors available, longer wait times, and, most
notably, the driving distances for women more than 150 miles from a
provider increased from 86,000 to 400,000.55 These burdens, taken together
with the virtual absence of any health benefit, led the Court to the “undue
burden” conclusion that H.B. 2 is no more effective than the preexisting
Texas law.56
Lastly, the Court addressed and dismissed the dissent’s argument that
clinics may have closed for reasons unrelated to the provisions of H.B. 2.57
The Court found that the petitioners “satisfied their burden to present
evidence of causation by presenting direct testimony as well as plausible
inferences to be drawn from the timing of the clinic closures.”58 In
concluding this point, the Court found that the dissent incorrectly speculated
that H.B. 2 may have targeted unsafe clinics, that an extra layer of
regulation would not have deterred the type of “determined wrongdoers”
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2310-11.
52. Id. at 2311; Brief for Respondents at 32-37, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
53. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Brief for Society of Hospital Medicine et
al. as Amici Curiae at 11, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2313 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681).
56. Id. at 2314; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87).
57. Id. at 2313.
58. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
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contemplated by the dissent, and that the actions contemplated by the
dissent were already covered by existing Texas law.59
In Part V of the opinion, the Court supported the District Court’s
holding that the second challenged provision, H.B. 2’s surgical-center
requirement, provided no further health benefits for women and it posed a
substantial obstacle to women seeking an abortion, and therefore is
considered to be an undue burden.60 The Court found that making clinics
comply with the surgical-center standards provided no benefits to patients
as almost all complications arise after the patient has left the clinic, and that
the upgrades required would leave only seven or eight clinics operating in
the State of Texas.61 Decreasing the amount of clinics would mean that
clinics which were providing 14,000 abortions annually would now take on
upwards of 70,000 abortions annually.62 The Court noted that “common
sense suggests that, more often than not, a physical facility that satisfies a
certain physical demand will not be able to meet five times that demand
without expanding or otherwise incurring significant costs.”63
The dissent argued that many facilities operate under full capacity and
clinics would be able to handle the increase in patients or could increase the
capacity.64 In regard to this argument, the Court responded that not only are
medical facilities already known for their lengthy wait-times, while
operating under capacity, but the amount of closed facilities due to the
admitting-privileges requirement would mean a decrease in the number of
available physicians that facilities could hire.65
What the Court found fundamental was that Texas sought to make
women travel long distances to facilities that will likely lack personal
attention, emotional support, and security in the ability to have serious
conversations with doctors.66 The Court attributed the potential decline in
quality of care to the fully taxed facilities operating beyond capacity
because of the closure of facilities due to the surgical-center requirements,
which poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions and
constitutes an undue burden.67
In Part VI of the opinion, the Court “consider[ed] three additional
arguments Texas ma[de] and deem[ed] none persuasive.”68 First, Texas
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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argued that H.B. 2’s severability clause precluded invalidation of the two
challenged provisions as Texas argued that if a court finds any portion to be
invalid, that portion can be severed and the rest of the Act will not be
affected.69 The Court found that even though an attempt of a severability
clause existed, it does not mean the Court must apply partial measures when
it has been found that the provisions were facially unconstitutional.70
Second, Texas does not view the two provisions as substantial
obstacles, which are compulsory requirements that must be met in order to
satisfy the undue burden standard.71 Texas explains that H.B. 2 provisions
only apply to certain women of reproductive age, which would not be a
“large fraction” as required by Casey.72 The Court reasoned that in this
case, as in Casey, “the relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for whom
[the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.”73
Lastly, Texas cites Simonpoulous v. Virginia,74 where the Court upheld
a surgical-center requirement applicable to second-trimester abortions.75
Unlike Simonpoulous, the provisions before the Court in the instant case
apply to all abortions and, moreover, Casey clarified ‘viability’ as the
relevant point on limiting a woman’s access to abortion, rather than the
trimester framework.76
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice Ginsburg
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed how safe and
low the complication rates of abortions are and to find that the argument or
justification that H.B. 2 could protect women is beyond belief.77
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg argued that many procedures unrelated to
abortions are performed in the United States that are far more dangerous,
including childbirth itself, yet are not subjected to neither admittingprivilege requirements nor surgical-center requirements.78 In closing,
Justice Ginsburg stated that H.B. 2’s provisions are unnecessary, as they do
nothing for a woman’s health and unfairly subject women to difficult
pathways to obtaining abortions.79
69. Id. at 2318; see Brief for Respondents at 50-52, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
70. Id. at 2319.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2319 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95).
73. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95).
74. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
75. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320.
76. Id.; see generally Simonpoulous, 462 U.S. at 506).
77. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Schimel, 806
F.3d at 912).
78. Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921-22.
79. Id. at 2321; see Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921.
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C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the majority decision not only
exemplifies the Court’s tendency to bend the rules when abortion is the
issue,80 but also “creates an abortion exception to ordinary rules of res
judicata, ignores compelling evidence that Texas’ law imposes no
unconstitutional burden and disregards basic principles of the severability
doctrine.”81 Initially, in Part I, Justice Thomas criticized the case as one
which should never have been brought in front of the Supreme Court, given
that for most of the Nation’s history, cases could not be brought by third
parties in order to vindicate the rights of another.82 Justice Thomas sternly
noted that the Court has been especially willing to relax the rules
specifically for due process rights as they related to abortion:
[t]here is no surer sign that our jurisprudence has gone off the rails
than this: After creating a constitutional right to abortion because ‘it
involve[s] the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make . . . ,’83 the Court has created special rules that cede its
enforcement to others.84
In Part II, Justice Thomas stated that the Court misinterpreted the undue
burden standard in Casey in three ways.85 First, Justice Thomas argued that
Casey did not intend to balance the benefits and burdens of provisions;
rather, the Court in Casey evaluated the provisions posed for undue burden
without weighing the benefits.86 Second, by discarding the opinion that
“legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical
uncertainty,” the majority abandoned the traditional rule in Casey of
respecting deference to legislatures’ decisions related to areas of medical
uncertainty.87 Lastly, he argued that the majority overruled an outcome of
Casey “by requiring laws to have more than a rational basis [to act] even if
they do not substantially impede access to abortion.”88 Therefore, although
the amount is unknown, the level of state’s interest must now be greater

80. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
81. Id. at 2321.
82. Id. at 2321-22.
83. Id. at 2323 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (majority opinion).
84. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2323 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2323-24.
86. Id. at 2324 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87).
87. Id. at 2325.
88. Id.
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than a basic “rational basis,” which has inflamed to a level never used
before.89
Further, in Part III, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s undue burden
test as it is “a made-up test”90 and resembles the strict-scrutiny standard that
Casey explicitly rejected, under which only the utmost convincing
rationales justified restrictions or provisions on abortion.91 Justice Thomas
believes the Court should only adopt policy preferences which balance
constitutional rights and interests92 and abandon any other tinkering with the
levels of scrutiny to achieve its desired result.93
Lastly, in Part IV, Justice Thomas respectfully dissented, identifying
that the Court has “simultaneously transformed judicially created rights like
the right to abortion into preferred constitutional rights, while disfavoring
many of the rights actually enumerated in the Constitution.”94 Justice
Thomas reasoned that the Court is not to favor some rights over others,
which has occurred with abortion,95 and argued that, instead the Court is to
abide by one set of rules, namely the Constitution, rather than creating
policy-driven value judgments.96
D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,
dissented.97 Justice Alito criticized the majority for abandoning their
neutral views and well-established law when abortion is brought before the
Court.98 In Part I, he argued that the Court has created an unprecedented
exception to res judicata, where one may relitigate their invalid
constitutional claim if new and better supporting evidence99 is later
produced, which, he argued, is entirely contrary to the Nation’s case law,100
the first Restatement of Judgments and the rules of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgment.101 Justice Alito saw no possible reasoning for the
relitigation of the admitting privileges provision, unless at the time of prior

89. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2327 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
91. Id. at 2326; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 874-75 (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 2328.
93. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2327 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2329.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 2329-30.
97. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
98. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2337.
100. Id. at 2335 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 2339-40.
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litigation it was unable to be shown what effects the law would have,102
which was not the case since the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate their claim.103
In Part II, Justice Alito addressed the application of claim preclusion to
H.B. 2, chiefly the surgical-center provision.104 Justice Alito stated the
Court incorrectly addressed the H.B. 2 provisions as separate and distinct
(and therefore splitting the claims), while the petitioners, and Justice Alito
himself, view the transaction as a single unit that should not be split
following appropriately, § 24 of the Second Restatement.105 Justice Alito
reasoned that the two provisions are closely enough related as they both
execute regulations on abortion clinics, justified for the protection of
women’s health whom are seeking abortions, both impose the same burden,
and both are attacked by the petitioners as a single package.106 The two
provisions “form a convenient trial unit,”107 should not have been split, and
therefore the surgical-center provision, like the admitting-privileges
provision, should have been precluded.108
In Part III, Justice Alito argued that even if the claims were not
precluded, the petitioners did not meet their burden to prove that the
provisions had an unconstitutional impact, that is, an undue burden, on a
large fraction of Texas women.109 Justice Alito stated that the petitioners
relied on two loose inferences that the undue burden was placed on a large
fraction of Texas women.110 The first inference, with notably no evidence
to support it,111 was that the petitioners attributed the number of abortion
clinics that closed after the enactment of H.B. 2 to the implementation of the
two provisions.112 Justice Alito acknowledged that H.B. 2 intended to close
unsafe clinics, but he presented four alternative reasons as to why clinics
have closed.113 The second inference Justice Alito found was that the
number of abortions performed each year at closed clinics was well below
the total number of abortions, and, therefore, the clinics could not meet the
demands of women in the state, failing, however, to provide any evidence of
actual capacity of clinics.114 The petitioners put on evidence in the earlier
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2342 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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case that suggested the provision had no effect on capacity, and Justice
Alito found no reason as to why they were unable to, or chose not to here.115
In Part IV, Justice Alito went so far as to state that even if res judicata
did not apply or H.B. 2 did impose an undue burden, the Court was still
incorrect to rule that the admitting-privileges provision and surgical-center
provision must be enjoined in their entirety because of the severability
clause.116 Justice Alito reasoned that the admitting privileges clause is easy
to apply; the “requirement must be upheld in every city in which its
application does not pose an undue burden.”117
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

In Casey, the Supreme Court delivered a standard to govern the validity
of laws that placed restrictions on abortions.118 The standard examined
whether a state abortion regulation has the “purpose or effect” of imposing
an undue burden so that the provision “is to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”119 Following Casey, “the Court has repeatedly embraced Casey’s
understanding of substantive due-process analysis as requiring courts to
chart an evolving balance between individuals and the state.”120 Notably, in
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court answered Casey’s plea for reasoned
judgments and did away with efforts to limit due-process liberty by
reducing it to historical manifestations.121
In Whole Woman’s Health, the majority opinion upheld the role courts
play in ensuring that states respect the constitutional principles of liberty,
equality, and dignity.122 This analysis focuses on these holdings, namely:
(1) third-party standing issues (2) evaluating the role of claim preclusion in
constitutional challenges;123 and (3) examination and future application of
the undue burden standard.124

115. Id.
116. Id. at 2350.
117. Id.
118. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2342-43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)).
119. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
120. Metzger, supra note 15.
121. Id.
122. See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292.
123. See id. at 2304-09.
124. See id. at 2309-18.
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B. Discussion
1. Third-Party Standing
Up until the twentieth century, individuals could not challenge a statute
to vindicate the rights of others.125 In the twentieth century, the Court began
recognizing exceptions, while attaching limits for individuals who sued
asserting third parties’ rights.126 Justice Thomas stated that the Court grants
exceptions “only if the plaintiff ha[s] a ‘close relation to the third party’ and
the third party face[s] a formidable ‘hindrance’ to asserting his own
rights.”127
Justice Thomas stated that the only reason this case was before the
Court was because “the Court has shown a particular willingness to
undercut restrictions on third-party standing when the right to abortion is at
stake.”128 Specifically, Justice Thomas believes the Court has erroneously
been more forgiving when the cases involve abortion clinics and physicians
asserting the substantive due process right of a woman to have an
abortion.129 Justice Thomas found the majority inconsistent when the Court
stated that the right to abortion is one of the most personal and intimate
decisions central to personal autonomy, yet has created rules that allow for
others to enforce this claim for an individual.130
The general bar on third-party standing is simply a principle, subject to
exceptions, and that bar is removed when it is believed that right-holders are
unlikely to come forward to defend their own rights.131 Given the private
nature of an abortion decision, and the potential publicity of a lawsuit, the
incentive for women to come forward is rather unpleasant.132 Despite
strong arguments for upholding standing law, the Singleton plurality found,
as did the majorities in Eisenstadt, Griswold, Craig, and Powers, that a
general principle is subject to exceptions and physicians and clinics
bringing suit on behalf of women, is appropriate third-party standing.133
Since the decision in Singleton, doctors’ and clinics’ assertions of
constitutional rights of both patients and hypothetical patients have been

125. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2322 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2322.
127. See id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Michael Dorf, The Procedural Issues in the Texas Abortion Case, VERDICT-JUSTIA (June 29,
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/06/29/procedural-issues-texas-abortion-case.
131. See Dorf, supra note 130.
132. Stephen J. Wallace, Note: Why Third-Party Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer
Look, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1396 (2009).
133. Wallace, supra note 132, at 1397.
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accepted by the Court even when women have continued and successfully
asserted their own rights before the Court.134
Although Justice Thomas appears to have a convincing argument that
the Court seems to be more forgiving with third-party standing claims
involving abortions, “[t]he Court has held that a party to a civil case has
third-party standing to litigate the rights of prospective jurors and that a bar
owner has third-party standing to litigate the rights of her customers.”135 It
appears as though the Court has firmly established that abortion claims can
be brought by clinics or physicians on behalf of women.136 Therefore,
Justice Thomas’ claim that the Court has been more forgiving when it
comes to this matter is not supported by countless third-party standing
issues successfully argued before the Court.137
2. Evaluating the Role of Claim Preclusion
Undoubtedly, the majority and Justice Alito’s dissent disagree on the
fundamental execution of claim preclusion as applied to both the admitting
privileges requirement and the surgical-center requirement of H.B. 2.138
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, struck down both
provisions, finding them in violation of a woman’s constitutional right to
abortion.139 A separate dissent, written by Justice Alito, argued that the
Court should never have had the opportunity to address the substantive
issues, as the operative facts presented in this case had been previously
litigated.140 Following Justice Alito’s reasoning, the doctrine of claim
preclusion should have applied.141
This Court found that after provisions of a new law have been applied,
the circumstances had changed enough so that a previously litigated and
unsuccessful facial challenge on the same provisions may be brought before
the court again.142 The majority held that the unsuccessful facial challenge
in Abbott occurred prior to the enforcement of the provisions and prior to
many of the abortion clinics closing.143 The majority reasoned that, here,
the petitioners brought forth a challenge after the provisions had been
enforced and after many clinics have been closed, evidencing a dissimilarity
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
at 878).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2322 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Dorf, supra note 130.
Wallace, supra note 132.
See Dorf, supra note 130.
Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Casey, 505 U.S.
Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2340.
See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2305.
Id. at 2306.
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that evidently excludes itself from the doctrine of claim preclusion.144 The
majority mischaracterizes the judgment in Abbott as an unsuccessful
premature facial challenge, when instead the Court of Appeals held that the
evidence in Abbott was insufficient,145 and petitioners had the opportunity to
seek review, yet chose not to.146
The majority made an appealing argument that the claim in Abbott was
too speculative and that requiring litigants to challenge every single
provision would be unreasonable.147 However, this statement misses the
importance of the role that fundamental claim preclusion plays in the
American legal system;148 unsuccessful previously litigated claims,
extinguish claims that could have been brought in the first case.149 Again, it
appears as if the Court is playing with the rules of civil procedure because
of the substantive abortion claim.150 Justice Thomas undoubtedly agrees
with Justice Alito’s argument that when abortion issues come before the
Court, they “ream with procedural exceptions, as though the usual canons of
construction were reversed.”151
The Court found that claim preclusion did not bar challenges to the
admitting-privileges requirement.152 The Court reasoned that new material
facts were brought forth—facts relating to important human values that
have the ability to produce a new claim.153 The majority failed to recognize
that the first suit and the present claim “involve the very same ‘operative
facts,’ namely, the enactment of the admitting privileges requirement, which
according to the theory underlying petitioners’ facial claims, would have the
exact same effect of causing abortion clinics to close.”154 Justice Alito’s
dissent correctly describes the majority’s new material evidence as merely
being brought before the Court as they now have “better evidence than they
did at the time of the first case with respect to the number of clinics that
would have to close as a result of the admitting privileges requirement.”155
With an adequate amount of supporting evidence, the majority’s holding is
in violation of the underlying rationale of claim preclusion; parties may not
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
28, 2016,
roe/.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
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Id. at 2335; see Abbott, 748 F.3d at 598-99.
Id. at 2335.
Dorf, supra note 130.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2340.
Erika Bachiochi, Symposium: Is Hellerstedt This Generation’s Roe?, SCOTUSBLOG (June
11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-is-hellerstedt-this-generationsBachiochi, supra note 150.
See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2304.
See id. at 2305; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. f (1980).
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2333 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2335.
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relitigate their case because they have gathered better evidence, or more
bluntly, claim preclusion does not contain a “better evidence” exception.156
The majority sought support of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
24, comment f, finding that new material facts can bring a previously
litigated case before the court as a new claim, and it relied on previous
Court holdings for support.157 Analyzing the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24, comment f, it is evident that new material should be
brought forth only in limited circumstances, and the Restatement gives three
hypothetical cases of limited circumstances—none of which appear to
portray the presented situation in the case before the Court.158 Further, upon
examination of the majority’s case support for Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 24, comment f, it has little, if any, weight to the question at
issue; the cases presented fail to address claim preclusion, and if the cases
do slightly reference claim preclusion,159 they “endorse the unremarkable
proposition that a prior judgment does not preclude new claims based on
acts occurring after the time of the first judgment.”160 Most notably,
“[w]hen the highest court in the land relies upon a comment from the
Second Restatement of Judgments, rather than its own precedent, you know
the Justices are blazing a trail laid especially for abortion.”161 This is an
issue that has presented itself time and time again “which must be chalked
up to the Court’s inclination to bend the rules when any effort to limit
abortion, or even speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.”162
Moreover, the majority held that the doctrine of claim preclusion does
not prevent the parties from challenging the surgical-center requirement of
H.B. 2 in this Court.163 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recognized that the petitioners did not bring their claim in Abbott, but
should have done so, because the surgical-center requirement and the
admitting-privileges requirement arose from the same transaction, involved
the same parties and facilities, were enacted at the same time, and there was
156. See id.; see, e.g., Torres v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If simply submitting
new evidence rendered a prior decision factually distinct, res judicata would cease to exist”); Geiger v.
Foley Hoag LLP Retirement Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (claim preclusion “applies even if the
litigant is prepared to present different evidence . . . in the second action”); International Union of
Operating Engineers-Employers Constr. Industry Pension, Welfare and Training Trust Funds v. Karr,
994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (new evidence may be presented, but that does not defeat the
doctrine of res judicata).
157. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2305.
158. See id. at 2336-37 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 2335 (Alito, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 772
(1931); Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955); Third Nat. Bank of
Louisville v. Stone, 174 U.S. 432, 434 (1899).
160. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2335.
161. Bachiochi, supra note 150.
162. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954.
163. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol43/iss1/8

16

Claxton: WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT

2017]

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT

273

a common nucleus of operative fact.164 Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, reasoned that “[t]he Court of Appeals failed, however, to take
account of meaningful differences . . . [t]he surgical-center provision and
the admitting-privileges provision are separate, distinct provisions . . .
set[ting] forth two different, independent requirements with different
enforcement dates.”165 Justice Breyer stated that the Court has never
mandated that relating separate claims must be brought before the Court in a
single suit, and if this were the case, it would encourage a “kitchen sink
approach” which would only have detrimental effects on court
proceedings.166
In regard to “splitting” claims167 as the majority has demonstrably done
here, the Second Restatement bars from litigation “any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose.”168 It is evident that the two claims are closely related, as they are
both provisions in H.B. 2 that the petitioners attack as a single package,
arguing that the provisions enact new requirements onto abortion clinics, for
the combined effect of closing down clinics.169 Therefore, unsuccessful
previously litigated claims extinguish claims that could have been brought
in the first case, and the doctrine of claim preclusion should apply.170
The doctrine of claim preclusion is a foundational element in the
American legal system.171 As stated in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men’s Asso.,172 “[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation[,]
that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the
contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as
between the parties.”173 The majority lacks precedent and patently
disregards the well-founded doctrine of claim preclusion.174 Ironically, if
the case had been decided on procedural grounds, punting the substantive
issue into the near future, a Court with a new appointment may have used
the opportunity to overturn the Casey/Gonzales v. Carhart compromise in
favor of something more like Roe.175 Lastly, in regard to constitutional
164. See id. at 2307 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 581).
165. See id. at 2308.
166. Id.
167. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2340 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2341; Brief for Petitioners at 40-44, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016) (No. 15-274).
170. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2340.
171. Id. at 2331.
172. 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
173. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331 (Alito, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 2332.
175. Bachiochi, supra note 150.
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issues, the Court’s “refusal to apply well-established law in a neutral way is
indefensible and will undermine public confidence in the Court as a fair and
neutral arbiter.”176
3. Future Application of the Undue Burden Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has demonstrably rubber
stamped state laws that would close abortion clinics across the state of
Texas—an evident and inadequate execution of protecting woman’s rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment.177 By finding H.B. 2 in violation of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court furthered the notion that the
“Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose abortion and . . . courts
have an obligation to carefully review state regulation of abortion to ensure
that it respects the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty for all.”178
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, held that the undue burden
standard, “requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on
abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer,”179 therefore,
more than just rubber stamping state laws is needed to protect the rights of
women.180
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a state law
“constitutional if (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus; and (2) it is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a
legitimate state interest.”181 The Court of Appeals is incorrect in this
articulation, as the test may be read to imply that medical benefits should
not be taken into consideration when considering whether an abortion
regulation constitutes an undue burden; the Court of Appeals’ decision
plainly deviates from the rule announced in Casey.182
The undue burden test that Justice Breyer prescribed in the case at bar is
not that of the Court rubber stamping legislators’ decisions; it requires the
Court to take a more meaningful approach.183 With the undue benefit test,
courts now will consider limitations of access, but also the benefits that the
176. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331.
177. See David Gans, Symposium: No More Rubber-Stamping State Regulation of Abortion,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-no-morerubber-stamping-state-regulation-of-abortion/.
178. Gans, supra note 177.
179. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98 (balancing the
spousal notification provision).
180. See Gans, supra note 177.
181. Id. at 2309 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 572).
182. See id. at 2309.
183. See Mary Ziegler, Symposium: The Court Once Again Makes the “Undue-Burden” Test a
Referendum on the Facts, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 2:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/
06/symposium-the-court-once-again-makes-the-undue-burden-test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/.
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regulations will impose.184 A meaningful approach will not abandon
legislative findings (Justice Breyer indicated that the relevant statute in the
case at bar did not set forth any legislative findings),185 but rather, the
legislature now works together with the courts, who will retain the power to
balance the benefits and burdens.186 Exemplifying this point, “[the district
court] did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature .
. . [rather] [t]he district court considered the evidence in the record—
including expert evidence, presented in stipulations, depositions, and
testimony . . . then weighed the asserted benefits against the burdens.”187 In
comparison, Justice Thomas, writing in his dissent, argued that this was “a
way that will surely mystify lower courts for years to come.”188 Rather, the
undue burden standard will maintain the integrity of our courts, ensuring
that both sides bring compelling, well-researched arguments before the
courts, and therefore it will no longer lay in the hands of the legislature to
ensure women’s rights are best protected.189
It is evident that laws like H.B. 2 “are not the product of some new
enthusiasm for promoting women’s health but of a resourceful anti-abortion
movement.”190 Many other medical procedures are far more dangerous, but
do not have restrictions imposed on them, such as the ones H.B. 2 imposes
on the women of Texas;191 abortion notably being “one of the safest medical
procedures performed in the United States.”192 The Court found that
nothing in Texas’ record evidences their argument that “the new law
advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health,”193 rather,
they impose substantial obstacles in the way of woman seeking an abortion,
which in turn imposes an undue burden on this constitutionally protected
right.194 The reanimation of the undue burden standard issued by the Court
signals “trouble ahead for that approach [the undue burden], not only in

184. See Ziegler, supra note 183.
185. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-10.
186. See Ziegler, supra note 183.
187. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310.
188. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. See Ziegler, supra note 183.
190. Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application of the Undue-Burden Standard for
Abortion, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-supremecourts-just-application-of-the-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion.
191. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Schimel 806 F.3d
at 921-22; see also Brief for Social Science Researchers as Amici Curiae at 9-11, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) (comparing abortion statistics with other
surgeries).
192. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Brief for Social Science Researchers as
Amici Curiae at 5-9, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274)).
193. Id. at 2311.
194. Id. at 2312.
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Texas but in other states—including Oklahoma, Louisiana, and
Wisconsin—where similar laws are currently blocked by lower courts.”195
V.

CONCLUSION

Twenty years after the landmark case, Casey, was decided, Whole
Woman’s Health presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
enumerate specific state action, which constitutes an undue burden on
abortion access to women.196 The Court, finding H.B. 2 unconstitutional,
correctly held that if the primary purpose of a state’s legislative or
regulatory scheme “is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability,”197 an undue burden
exists and the provision of a law is constitutionally invalid.198 Here, the
undue burden standard will maintain the integrity of our courts, ensuring
that both sides bring compelling, well-researched arguments before the
courts, and therefore it will no longer lay in the hands of the legislature to
ensure women’s rights are best protected.199
KELLY LYNN CLAXTON

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Talbot, supra note 190.
Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
Id. at 2300 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
See Ziegler, supra note 183.
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